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Existing theories of WTO law cannot adequately explain the form or content of the GATT
exceptions, in particular Article XX(a) Public Morals. Nor, in consequence, can they satisfac-
torily answer the interpretive questions they raise. This article explains Article XX in terms
of self-determination as a political and moral value, and the choices it mandates peoples make
for themselves. Drawing on debates in contemporary political philosophy, it distinguishes three
categories of argument for self-determination: intrinsic, expressive and instrumental, each hav-
ing implications for the scope of the choices a self-determining community must make for
itself. This account of self-determination in trade regulation is used to reconstruct Article XX,
both explaining the individual provisions, and suggesting how these might be developed and
interpreted. It concludes by examining Article XX(a) in detail, highlighting the interpretive
questions public morals pose, and how understanding Article XX in terms of self-determination
suggests these should be answered.
INTRODUCTION
WTO law expresses a recurring tension between multilateral discipline and
unilateral choice. In some cases, that tension falls to be resolved within individ-
ual provisions. In others, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
it is expressed through a balance of rules and exceptions. On one hand, the
GATT comprises a set of restrictions on, inter alia, tariffs (Article II), quantita-
tive restrictions (Article XI), and discrimination, whether against (Article III) or
amongst (Article I) trading partners (together, the ‘Core Disciplines’). On the
other, it provides various exceptions, addressing economic (Article XII Balance
of Payments, Article XVIII Economic Development, Article XIX Safeguards)
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and non-economic (Article XX General Exceptions, Article XXI National
Security) concerns. WTO members’ freedom to enact particular measures de-
pends, first, on whether a measure is caught by one of the Core Disciplines, and
second, whether it falls within one of the exceptions. Indeed, it is primarily
under the exceptions, rather than the rules, that the GATT seeks to accom-
modate such sensitive concerns as environmental protection, public health and
public morals. The exceptions thus play a crucial role in delimiting members’
regulatory sovereignty.
A plausible account of the GATT must therefore explain both the rules and
the exceptions. My concern in this paper is the exceptions, and in particular
Article XX, which I argue is inadequately explained in existing theories of
WTO law. In consequence, those theories have struggled to provide interpretive
guidance or critical standards for the various exceptions in Article XX, or to
legitimise the - often controversial - decisions ofWTO panels and the Appellate
Body (AB) thereunder. Given the centrality of Article XX in the GATT case-
law, this is a serious failing.
To remedy this I advance a novel account of Article XX, as expressing the
distinctive moral and political value of self-determination. Drawing on vari-
ous existing arguments for self-determination, I show how these can identify
its limits in supporting states’ claims to regulate particular matters, notwith-
standing the effects such regulation may have on outsiders. I show how these
limits can in turn explain the form of the various exceptions in Article XX.
Finally, I apply this account to explain and critique one exception in particular,
Article XX(a), which exempts measures ‘necessary to protect public morals’. I
highlight the interpretive questions this provision raises, the Appellate Body’s
difficulties answering these, and how thinking about Article XX(a) in terms of
self-determination can contribute to their satisfactory resolution.1
I focus on public morals for three reasons. First, their ambiguity. The scope of
Article XX(a) is open, and the subject of significant controversy.2 What exactly
are public morals? What does it mean to protect them? Are they concerned
with qualities of persons, communities, or actions? Whose morals are at stake,
and where? Debates about Article XX(a) have pitted advocates of a maximalist
understanding, motivated by concerns for national autonomy, pluralism and
global subsidiarity; against more minimal interpretations from those worried
about disguised protectionism, international stability, and more generally that
an expansive interpretation of Article XX(a) risks entirely subsuming the Core
Disciplines themselves.3 Howse, Langille and Sykes, for example, deny that
1 While my focus is the exceptions, these cannot be fully divorced from our understanding of the
Core Disciplines themselves. For my account of these, see, O. Suttle, ‘Equality in Global Com-
merce: Towards a Political Theory of International Economic Law’ (2014) 25 European Journal
of International Law 1043. There is some interdependence between the scope of the disciplines
and the exceptions, as a broader interpretation of the former inspires calls for broadening the
latter, and vice versa.
2 It is unsurprising that those advocating a broad interpretation of Article XX(a) also advocate
permissive interpretations of the Core Disciplines themselves. See, for example, R. Howse and
D. Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction - an Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’
in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249.
3 For an overview of the debates, see S. Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’ (1997)
38 Va J Int’l L 689; J. C. Marwell, ‘Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception
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Panels or the Appellate Body should examine the authenticity of asserted pub-
lic morals, whether in terms of public support, legislative history, or connection
to particular interests of the regulating people: rather, they suggest enquiring
only whether the relevant concerns are ones that could count as moral reasons
at all.4 Wu, by contrast, suggests limiting public morals to issues anticipated
by the original drafters, falling under jus cogens norms, or widely recognised
by members as being moral issues; that only measures passed through standard
legislative procedures be eligible; and that additional domestic support and in-
ternational codification be required where a measure concerns issues outside
the territory.5 The debate between minimalists and maximalists thus translates
into subordinate debates: about whether invoking public morals requires evi-
dence of actual moral beliefs in the relevant state,6 or to be endorsed through a
particular representative – including democratic – procedure7; about whether
the morals at stake are exclusively those of the regulating state, or must be
shared by other states;8 and about whether the moral concerns must relate to
activities within the territory, or can extend to events in other states.9 Article
XX(a) offers no guidance, and while the AB has touched on many of these
questions, it has done little to clarify. Yet each of these competing interpre-
tations expresses a judgment about why public morals matter, and about the
choices particular communities should be free to make; so adjudicating them
surely requires an account of why and how we should make such judgments.
Second, Article XX(a) is potentially important for a number of ‘linkage’ is-
sues, including the relations between the trade regime and human rights, labor
rights, animal rights and environmental protection.10 Each can be understood
in moral terms, and so might fall under Article XX(a). How we understand
public morals will therefore significantly affect the balance the trade regime
strikes between trade and competing values. However, this is not a one-way
street. Rather, our sense of the correct balance should inform our interpreta-
tion of Article XX(a). We thus need to locate our analysis of the latter in a
after Gambling’ (2006) 81 New York University Law Review 802, 817; M. Wu, ‘Free Trade and
the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly Emerging Public Morals Clause
Doctrine’ (2008) 33 Yale J Int’l L 215; R. L. Howse, J. Langille and K. Sykes, ‘Pluralism in
Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO after Seal Products’ (2015) 48 George
Washington International Law Review 81.
4 Howse, Langille and Sykes, n 3 above, 95-106.
5 Wu, n 3 above, 243-246.
6 For example, Marwell, n 3 above, 824-826.
7 Wu, n 3 above, 243-244.
8 For the former view, see Marwell, n 3 above, 824. For elements of the latter, see Charnovitz, n 3
above, 742-743; O. A. Sykes ‘Sealing animal welfare into the GATT exceptions: the international
dimension of animal welfare in WTO disputes’ (2014) 12 World Trade Review 471.
9 For concerns about such extraterritorial measures, see Wu, n 3 above, 245-246. For an approach
adopting general international law rules on jurisdiction, see L. Bartels, ‘Article XX of the GATT
and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection
of Human Rights’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 353.
10 For example, R. Howse, ‘TheWorld Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers ‘Rights’
(1999) 3 J Small & Emerging Bus L 131; L. Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs (Leiden:
Brill, 2007) 230; L. M. Jarvis, ‘Women’s Rights and the Public Morals Exception of GATT
Article 20’ (2000) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 219; S. H. Cleveland, ‘Human Rights
Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility’ (2002) 5 Journal of International
Economic Law 133.
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wider account of Article XX, and of the WTO’s rule/exception balance more
generally.
Third, the liberal perspectives that dominate much international legal and
political scholarship are skeptical of any role for law in protecting morals. Ac-
counting for a public morals exception therefore seems particularly challenging
for liberals.11 Of course, in the international context, the fact of pluralism –
including moral pluralism – is undeniable, and a public morals exception is an
obvious place to accommodate that fact. However, this simply reinforces the
need to understand the proper scope of that exception, and the consequent
balance it requires between competing moral commitments.
The argument proceeds in a number of steps. Following a brief overview
of Article XX, I first explain why we need an appropriate account of Article
XX. I introduce the concept of justificatory explanation, outlining its role
in legal interpretation and the difficulties existing economic and sociological
approaches have in grounding a suitable justificatory explanation of Article
XX. This, I suggest, greatly limits their value in informing the interpretation
of Article XX, reinforcing the need for a new approach.
I therefore set out, in the middle parts of the article, to tell a different story,
about self-determination understood as a distinctive political and moral value.
That Article XX has something to do with self-determination, understood
as sovereign choice, is uncontroversial.12 However this tells us nothing about
which matters are reserved to sovereign choice. One agent’s claim to make
choices about a particular matter necessarily excludes the like potential claims
of others.13 Disputes arise where two communities prefer different choices
on an issue. To adjudicate between these, we require an account of why it
is valuable for a particular choice to be made by a particular community. This
demands not simply an invocation of self-determination, but rather an account
of its value.
In order to construct such an account, I examine three sets of arguments
for self-determination. The first, intrinsic accounts, understand collective self-
determination as grounded in individual autonomy. The second, expressive
accounts, understand it as an implication of the equal status of peoples, and
the equal respect due to them. The third, instrumental accounts, understand
it as valuable in facilitating the realisation of other important goods, which
prominently include individual autonomy, stability, and basic rights protection.
Each approach plays important roles in accounting for international legal and
political practices of self-determination. Intrinsic accounts are most intuitively
obvious. Expressive accounts seem important in explaining post-colonial self-
determination. However, it is instrumental accounts that do most work in
explaining the GATT exceptions generally, and Article XX in particular.
11 That public morals raise this distinctive challenge is highlighted in: R. Howse and J. Langille,
‘Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade
Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International
Law 367.
12 J. H. Jackson The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997) 233.
13 For this point in an economic model, see J. Trachtman, ‘Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO’
(2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 631.
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By integrating insights from intrinsic, expressive and instrumental ap-
proaches, I construct a novel account of self-determination in international
trade regulation. I show how that account can help us to understand Article
XX, highlighting its implications for interpreting both the individual excep-
tions and the chapeau. With this in place, I turn specifically to Article XX(a),
highlighting the questions that provision raises, and how understanding public
morals in terms of self-determination can answer these and thereby guide the
law’s progressive development.
Two points merit clarification at this stage. First, the approach to self-
determination adopted is deflationary; it denies that self-determination con-
stitutes an all-purpose justification for policies adopted by states. Rather, it
enquires whether specific invocations of self-determination can be traced back
to an account of the value of self-determination, and an explanation of why the
right to choose the particular policy is itself necessary to that value.
Second, and relatedly, it does not assume that self-determination will always,
or even often, feature in the justification of measures. In many cases, no specific
justification is demanded: Article XX only comes into play in respect of a
specific subset of measures that is caught by the Core Disciplines. In other
cases, a specific justification might be required, but it might invoke some other
value, for example distributive justice.14
My political and moral premises are those of liberal cosmopolitanism: in-
dividualism, generality and universality.15 Much has been done in other areas
of international law to reconstruct historically statist doctrines in liberal cos-
mopolitan terms.16 In international economic law that work is only begin-
ning.17 Others derive from these premises accounts of just economic distribu-
tion.18 I instead understand them as posing a challenge of institutional justifica-
tion.19 Cosmopolitanism precludes justifying state action to outsiders in terms
of raison d’etat. Instead, we must offer outsiders justifications that they have
reason to accept, as free and equal persons and peoples.20 Self-determination
is one such justification, and the one I suggest is most relevant to Article XX.
The argument thus has two, related, goals: first, to elaborate such a justification
of GATT Article XX; and second, to show how understanding Article XX in
these terms can guide its interpretation and progressive development, with a
specific focus on Article XX(a).21
14 On both, see Suttle, n 1 above.
15 T. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’ (1992) 103 Ethics 48.
16 For example, J. McMahan, ‘The Ethics of Killing in War’ (2004) 114 Ethics 693.
17 See, for example, T. Pogge, ‘The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty’
and R. Howse and R. Teitel, ‘Global Justice, Poverty and the International Economic Order’,
both in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
18 For example, C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979); D. Moellendorf, Cosmopolian Justice (Boulder, Co: Westview Press,
2001); T. W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights : Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); F. J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Towards a Liberal Theory
of Just Trade (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers,2003).
19 On this strategy, see M. Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy’ (2001) 30
Philosophy & Public Affairs 257, 262.
20 For more on the methodology, see Suttle, n 1 above.
21 We might go further, arguing that the correct interpretation of Article XX is the one suggested
here. This might reflect Dworkin’s interpretivist theory of law, which claims that the law simply
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THE STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE XX
Article XX comprises two elements. First, the introductory language, or
chapeau, which reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . .
Second, ten individual paragraphs, referring to particular policies or concerns:
public morals (XX(a)); human, animal and plant life and health (XX(b)); se-
curing compliance with laws (XX(d)); national treasures (XX(f)); exhaustible
natural resources (XX(g)); prison labor (XX(e)); import or export of gold or sil-
ver (XX(c)); and provisions for commodity agreements (XX(h)) and managing
supply of raw materials and products in short supply (XX(i) and (j)).
The individual paragraphs each include specific language identifying a re-
quired nexus between the policy or goal mentioned, and the measure requiring
to be justified. In some paragraphs, this requires that measures be ‘necessary to’
achieve the relevant goal, whereas in others they need only ‘relate to’ it.22
A number of points merit mention. First, Article XX comprises a closed list
of exempted goals and policies. Not every bona fide non-protectionist policy
is exempted.23 Second, the combined effect of the chapeau and the nexus
language in individual paragraphs is that states are closely circumscribed in how
far, in pursuing exempted goals, they can accommodate other, non-exempt,
considerations.24 Third, Article XX exempts unilateral measures. The AB has
emphasised that it is for members to decide for themselves at what level policies
in Article XX should be realised.25 This is despite the obvious international
public goods qualities of some of these.26 In consequence, the dispute in
is its best interpretation, in terms of fit and justification. In providing a moral argument for
the account of self-determination advanced and an explanation of the positive law in terms
of that account, I establish the main components of that argument. Alternatively, it might
reflect a doctrinal approach, invoking object and purpose in Article 31.1 VCLT. We cannot
identify multilateral treaties’ object and purpose with their authors’ intentions. Instead, we must
look to the texts, and to motives properly attributable to parties, leading to precisely the same
considerations as the first, interpretivist, argument. However, I advance neither claim here.
Moral argument looks different from different perspectives. My approach is unapologetically
liberal, invoking premises about the primacy of the individual, and the value of choice. Liberals
endorse these premises, but they are controversial for non-liberal persons and peoples, including
many WTO members. They might not therefore constitute an appropriate basis for interpreting
WTO agreements. Certainly, doing so requires more argument that I provide here.
22 Other examples include ‘undertaken in pursuance of’, ‘involving’ and ‘essential to’.
23 For this point: D. Regan, ‘How to Think About PPMs and Climate Change’ in T. Cottier,
O. Nartova and S. Z. Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate
Change (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) 119.
24 See, for example, Brazil-Tyres (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS332/AB/R §215, 225-227,
232.
25 For example, Korea-Beef (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS161/AB/R §176; EC - Asbestos
(Appellate Body Report) WT/DS135/AB/R §168; Brazil-Tyres ibid, §140.
26 Article XX contrasts in this regard with Article 36 TFEU, whose exceptions are subject to
harmonisation by the Union’s legislative organs.
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Article XX cases is only partly about the first order interests protected; it is
also importantly about the second order question of who gets to make choices
about those interests. Fourth, and by contrast, in one prominent case the AB
expressed concerns about unjustifiable unilateralism under Article XX27; and in
at least two it identified duties to negotiate with affected states before adopting
unilateral measures.28 These, then, are the key features of Article XX that
require explanation and/or justification.
ON JUSTIFICATORY EXPLANATION AND EXISTING APPROACHES
In the previous section, I identified a number of prominent features of Arti-
cle XX that I suggested required explanation. The sense of explanation that
concerns me here is justificatory explanation. This is an explanation of an
object or practice in terms of the value that it realises, explaining both its ex-
istence and its particular features in terms of its contribution to that value. It
has much in common with what Dworkin labels constructive interpretation;29
however, given controversies about the applicability of Dworkin’s wider theory
to international law, I prefer to avoid his terminology.30
Justificatory explanation is distinct from historical explanation, which exam-
ines the causal antecedents of an object or practice; or genealogical explanation,
which traces its intellectual roots and implicit understandings.31 Rather than
explaining where the object comes from, in either of these senses, it explains
how we, here and now, might understand the object, as something that we have
and that plays a role for us. It is justificatory, and so unavoidably normative: it
appeals to some scheme of values against which we can judge the contribution
of the object under scrutiny. But it is also explanatory, in that it must account
27 US-Shrimp (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS58/AB/R §166-168.
28 ibid; US-Gasoline (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS2/AB/R, 27-28.
29 See generally, R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986).
The most obvious distinction between my approach and Dworkin’s is my argument’s beginning
with political morality rather than legal doctrine.
30 On the relevance of Dworkin’s view internationally, see J. Tasioulas, ‘In Defence of Relative
Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 85; B. C¸ali, ‘On Interpretivism and International Law’ (2009) 20 European Journal of Inter-
national Law 805; J. A. Beckett, ‘Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites
of Law’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 627. For Dworkin’s own effort in this
direction, see R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy for International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy &
Public Affairs 2. The strongest objection to extending Dworkin’s approach internationally is that
the reasons he sees for having regard to past political decisions in adjudication, which primarily
concern legality and the judge’s relation to the community, may not obtain internationally. By
reasoning from morals to law, rather than vice-versa, I substantially avoid that objection. There
are other good reasons for international adjudicators to have regard to the past, which explains
why the argument must end up with the law; but these are primarily instrumental and epistemic,
so the specific objections to interpretivism and integrity don’t arise. These methdological issues
are discussed in more detail in O. Suttle, Distributive Justice and World Trade Law: A Political Theory
of International Trade Regulation (Cambridge: CUP, forthcoming 2017).
31 For examples of each in the trade context: A. I. Douglas, P. Mavroidis and A. Sykes, The Genesis
of the Gatt (Cambridge: CUP, 2008); A. Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism Re-Imagining
the Global Economic Order (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
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for the key features of the object or practice, explaining why we should have
this object or practice, as opposed to something else.
It is this latter quality that allows justificatory explanation to also serve our
interpretive needs as lawyers: by accounting for the principal features of an
area of law, a justificatory explanation can in turn suggest how these should
be interpreted. Historical explanations are of course frequently invoked for
this purpose but, given the diversity of states, looking to historical accounts
of object and purpose of multilateral treaties poses insurmountable theoretical
and practical challenges;32 while interpretation that appeals directly to socio-
logically shared understandings is incompatible with the legalised quality of the
modern trade regime.33 Justificatory explanation thus offers the best prospect
of identifying the object and purpose that settled doctrine requires must inform
treaty interpretation.34
The WTO’s received wisdom includes a number of standard explanations,
justificatory or otherwise, for Article XX. However, these struggle at the level
of specifics, and hence provide little interpretive guidance.
The most common economic explanation of Article XX, for example, sug-
gests that it serves to exempt bona fide non-protectionist (or, perhaps, domes-
tically efficient) measures from the Core Disciplines, and to ensure that states
are free to pursue legitimate non-trade policies.35 As a historical explanation,
this is no doubt sound. However, as a justificatory explanation, it struggles
to account for key features of Article XX, including its exempting of some
policies and not others, and its requirement for a close nexus between measure
and exempted policy. It suggests that we exempt all non-protectionist policies,
but this simply is not what Article XX does.36 In consequence, it offers little
guidance on interpreting the requirements actually appearing in Article XX.
Another explanation sees Article XX as exempting policies that are par-
ticularly important, notwithstanding their adverse trade impacts. States regard
their freedom of choice on issues in Article XX as more important, this view
suggests, than the economic benefits of liberal trade.37 Again, as a historical
32 On the limits of historic object and purpose in respect of Article XX in particular: Charnovitz,
n 3 above, 701.
33 On this evolution, see Lang, n 31 above, 240-246.
34 Article 31.1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
35 See, for example, D. Regan, ‘The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV: The Myth of Cost–Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 347, 366-369.
For the wider economic accounts of the WTO into which this explanation fits, see P. R.
Krugman, M. Obstfeld and M. J. Melitz, International Economics (Boston: Pearson, 2012) 260; G.
Maggi and A. Rodriguez-Clare, ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political
Pressures’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 574; K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger The Economics
of the World Trading System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002).
36 This in turn motivates arguments for more liberal interpretations of the Core Disciplines, and
specifically of non-discrimination: D. H. Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose And ‘like Products’ in
Article III:4 of the GATT (with Additional Remarks on Article II:2)’ (2002) 63 Journal of
World Trade 443; P. C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 257. This, however,
raises further problems about the relationship between disciplines and exceptions.
37 For this idea in an economic model of regulatory transactions: Trachtman, n 13 above, 635-
636, 644-646; and more generally J. P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008). Despite very different methodological
commitments, embedded liberals’ appeal to the GATT’s balance between liberal trade and
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explanation this seems eminently plausible: that members chose to exempt
specific policy areas from the Core Disciplines suggests that they particularly
valued their regulatory autonomy in these areas. However, this does not explain
why these areas are important, instead appealing to the revealed preferences of
members as expressed in the agreements.38 In consequence, it offers no justi-
ficatory account of the content - as opposed to the existence - of Article XX,
and in turn no guidance on its interpretation. Some scholars adopting this per-
spective invoke values including democracy, self-determination, pluralism and
cooperation to bolster their position.39 However, without more, these cannot
explain why some powers, and not others, should be reserved to states, or the
conditions that should apply. In consequence, interpretations of the specific
provisions of Article XX invoking values at this level of generality appear to
beg the question.
Given Article XX’s link to states’ choices, explaining it in terms of self-
determination seems most promising. The Core Disciplines restrict states’ free-
dom of action. If we thought those restrictions might otherwise conflict with
self-determination, then Article XX could be explained as resolving that con-
flict. However, to be useful this explanation must go beyond merely invoking
self-determination: we need an account of self-determination that explains why
some particular powers, and not others, are required to be exempted. This will
be an account of self-determination as a moral and political value; an account
of the powers that a political community requires to hold, and to exercise for
itself, and of the values that are thereby realised. It is to this that I turn in the
next section.40
UNILATERALISM, SELF-DETERMINATION AND SHARED GOALS
The challenge, then, is to identify the powers that properly fall under a claim
of self-determination. What powers must a people have, and exercise for them-
selves, in order to be regarded as self-determining? Answering this question
domestic autonomy has the same basic structure. See, for example, R. Howse, ‘From Politics
to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96
American Journal of International Law 94; A. Lang, ‘Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John
Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime’
(2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 81.
38 Economic approaches might seek to answer this by reference to aggregate welfare effects, but this
motivates a non-categorical cost-benefit approach, rather than the categorical approach actually
expressed in Article XX.
39 See, for example, Howse and Nicolaı¨dis’s call for ‘the spirit of embedded liberalism . . . to
be recovered and reinterpreted under the new conditions of globalization’: R. Howse and
K. Nicolaı¨dis, ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a
Step Too Far’ in R. B. Porter, P. Sauve´, A. Subramanian and A. B. Zampetti (eds), Efficiency,
Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2001) 227, 243. cf R. Howse and K. Nicolaı¨dis, ‘Towards a Global Ethics of
Trade Governance: Subsidiarity Writ Large’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 259.
40 The argument here complements the account of justice in trade regulation in Suttle, n 1 above.
However, it does not depend on that account. Rather, each of the existing approaches requires
to be complemented with an explanation, of this kind, why the specific goals in Article XX
should be exempted.
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will take us some way from the specifics of Article XX; but that answer is
in turn essential to constructing a useful account of Article XX in terms of
self-determination.
Self-determination is most frequently discussed in connection with na-
tional self-determination and secession.41 In that context, the discussion is
complicated by problems of identification (Which groups are entitled to self-
determination?), stability (What does self-determination mean for the integrity
of existing states?), and conflicting claims (How do we reconcile the claims of
the majority in a state, the majority in a region, and any dissenting minori-
ties in that region?). In consequence, much of the literature focuses on these
questions, rather than the scope of the powers claimed.42 Self-determination
is generally understood as comprising a claim to statehood or, where this is
not possible (usually, though not always, in response to the conflicting values
noted above), some lesser form of self-government.43 The precise powers a
state requires to be self-determining are rarely discussed.44 This literature can
still provide a starting point, however, as by examining the arguments advanced
for self-determination, we can in turn identify the scope of the powers each
supports. Once we know why self-determination is valuable, we can work out
what realising that value demands. This is the strategy followed here.
It might seem contradictory to explore the powers of states in terms of a
concept, self-determination, that is commonly attached to peoples, and asserted
against existing states. The contradiction is dissolved, however, once we recog-
nise that the claim to self-determination is itself a claim to constitute a political
unit, and includes within it subsidiary claims about the powers that unit should
have. The state is thus both the addressee of self-determination demands, and
the vehicle through which these seek realisation. To the extent states claim
legitimacy, they do so in part as vehicles their peoples’ self-determination. We
can thus reason from self-determination to the powers ostensibly legitimate
states properly claim.45
It might also be questioned here whether an explanation in terms of
self-determination is compatible with my stated starting point in liberal
cosmopolitanism. Certainly self-determination, with its emphasis on the
particular, is in tension with the universalising tendencies of cosmopolitanism.
However, the argument developed below is liberal and cosmopolitan in the
41 For an overview: N.Miscevic, ‘Nationalism’ in E. N. Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Stanford, Ca: Stanford University, Summer 2010 Edition).
42 Much of the debate focuses on whether nations, in particular, have a privileged claim to
self-determination. On the diversity of plausible groups: A. Margalit and J. Raz, ‘National Self-
Determination’ (1990) 87 Journal of Philosophy 439, 447. On disaggregating questions about
territories and the powers and duties attaching to them: R. E. Goodin, ‘What Is So Special
About Our Fellow Countrymen?’ (1988) 98 Ethics 663, 682.
43 D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 81.
44 For an excellent example, see ibid, 100.
45 I do not develop the argument’s implications for minorities demanding self-determination. It no
doubt has such implications, but these are beyond my scope, which is limited to Article XX. One
point where the two might interact is in the limits minorities’ claims imply on self-determining
choices of majorities, particularly under instrumental arguments. Without exploring the issue
here, it seems likely the interpretive proposals set out below could accommodate such minorities’
claims.
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following important senses. First, it is liberal in that it approaches the state
and the restrictions is imposes on us as an object of justification, rather than as
something natural or pre-political.46 I ask, from the perspective of persons and
peoples, how the exercise of authority by the state, and specifically the state
in its aspect as self-determining, might be justified; and, more particularly,
justified to those over whom that authority is exercised, in terms of reasons
that liberals can endorse. It is individualist in that, while I refer to both persons
and peoples, the arguments examined can all ultimately be understood as
addressed to persons: peoples intervene only in so far as we can understand
their claims as ultimately realising the good of persons. It is universalist and
generalist, in that I examine claims from the perspectives of both insiders and
outsiders, denying that states can simply look to their own in this regard. There
are certainly illiberal and anti-cosmopolitan conceptions of self-determination,
that value the nation as an entity distinct from its members, and that value
their own nation and co-nationals to the exclusion of outsiders, but these are
not my concern here. For those endorsing liberal premises, such conceptions
of the nation will be normatively unattractive, while their denial of equality
makes them incapable of grounding international justification.
Given these constraints, I divide arguments for self-determination into three
categories: intrinsic, expressive and instrumental. Intrinsic arguments see self-
determination as an aspect of autonomy, and as such intrinsically valuable.
Expressive arguments see it as necessary to express or respect some other value,
such as fairness or equality. Instrumental arguments see it as valuable because
it makes more likely the sustainable realisation of that some other value. I
address each category in turn, before integrating their conclusions to construct
a dual account of self-determination for the purposes of Article XX, including
elements of both unilateralism and shared goals.47
INTRINSIC ARGUMENTS
Intrinsic arguments see self-determination as an aspect of autonomy, and as such
intrinsically valuable. Despite being the most intuitively obvious arguments for
self-determination, they provide limited guidance on the scope of the powers
it requires.
Philpott advances one such argument.48 Beginning from a Kantian ac-
count of autonomy, he argues this implies not only liberty, democracy and
distributive justice, but also self determination, which he understands as
46 This concern with the justification of restrictions has been labeled the ‘Fundamental Liberal
Premise’: G. Gaus, S. Courtland, and D. Schmidtz, ‘Liberalism’ in E. N. Zalta (ed), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University, Spring 2015 Edition).
47 I do not address arguments from territory to self-determination. Simmons develops such an
argument, but concedes it has little relevance in the world as it is: A. J. Simmons, ‘On the
Territorial Rights of States’ (2001) 35 Nouˆs 300, 315. Like property, historical theories of
territory only matter if they are true, which they clearly are not. We must therefore turn to
consequentialist or contractualist accounts; but the scope of rights these support depends directly
on arguments for those rights, running only contingently through territoriality.
48 D. Philpott, ‘In Defense of Self-Determination’ (1995) 105 Ethics 352.
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promoting ‘participation and representation, the political activities of an au-
tonomous person’.49
Two separate claims about democratic autonomy motivate Philpott’s argu-
ment. The first is that self-determination promotes participation. Persons are
more likely to, and can more effectively, participate in the political process of a
community in which they feel at home, than one from which they are alien-
ated.50 It is participation in the political process, rather than agreement with its
outcome, that constitutes us as free citizens, and reconciles our individual free-
dom with the coercion of the state.51 My autonomy is therefore better realised
when I am a member of a self-determining political community.52 The second
is that persons’ interests are more effectively represented when they are not
aggregated with the interests of disparate others. We are not required to ‘con-
stantly combat or be drowned in the dissonance of foreign ways’, and can thus
‘more directly shape [our] political context and are thus more autonomous’.53
On this latter claim, it is outcomes that matter. We are more autonomous
when the law in fact represents our interests, regardless of our own partici-
pation in the political process.54 Unfortunately neither claim provides much
assistance in identifying the scope of the powers falling to a self-determining
people.
The participation claim asserts the value of a political sphere in which we can
effectively participate. However, it does not identify the scope of the choices
that fall to be made within that political sphere. They must presumably be
sufficient to give us a meaningful sense of ownership over our shared lives.
If our choices relate only to ephemera, or are wholly frustrated by external
factors, then autonomy is not realised.55 However, this cannot require that
we control all factors affecting how our lives go. Just as individual autonomy
must be reconcilable with living together with other autonomous agents, so
collective autonomy must respect the shared context in which polities act.
Where issues affect more than one community, one’s maximising claim of
autonomy necessarily conflicts with the similar claims of others. Some other
49 ibid, at 358
50 ibid, at 359
51 Philpott invokes both Kant and Rousseau in developing this account of autonomy.
52 Arguments for the intrinsic value of participation in shared political projects, and for collective
self-authorship, have a similar structure, see for example D. Miller, National Responsibility and
Global Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 88; D. Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge,
Mass: Polity, 2000) 162. cf J. McMahan, ‘The Limits of National Partiality’ in R. McKim and
J. McMahan (eds) The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: OUP, 1997) 107, 111. For an argument
combining aspects of both claims, together with instrumental arguments, see Y. Tamir, Liberal
Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) 69.
53 Philpott, n 48 above, 359.
54 As a claim about autonomy, this seems suspect. Whatever autonomy consists in, given diversity it
cannot require outcomes actually reflect one’s preferences. We might also query whether, given
political economy concerns, domestic decision-making is more likely to achieve this. cf E. B.
Kapstein and J. H. Rosenthal, Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) 70.
55 On what this might mean internationally, see Miller, Citizenship and National Identity n 52 above,
163 and G. Brock, Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 224.
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argument is required to explain where the balance between such maximising
claims is drawn.56
Similarly, while the outcome claim suggests that persons are more au-
tonomous when their preferences are more frequently reflected in political de-
cisions, it cannot tell us whose preferences should be reflected where decisions
affect both members and non-members of a particular political community.
Yet these are precisely the decisions that concern us. Again, we need more to
get from the outcome claim to an account of who should decide in such cases.
Philpott recognises these problems in his discussion of secessionists’ obliga-
tions to former compatriots, observing that self-determination applies only to
‘affairs that are truly [our] own’, but not matters affecting the wider state.57
However, what we understand to be exclusively the affairs of a particular
community will depend on our theory of justice, including importantly of
economic justice.58 Just as domestically liberal commitments motivate both
liberty rights and socio-economic rights, so internationally they imply both a
core of self-determination, and a complex of restrictions to respect the equal
rights of others.59
The intrinsic argument, then, offers little guidance on the scope of the
choices over which communities can expect to be self-determining. It demands
a range of choices sufficient to provide meaningful self-authorship;60 but tells us
little about the relationship between self-determination and decisions affecting
outsiders.
In consequence, it offers a very limited account of external self-
determination.61 Because external decisions necessarily relate to outsiders, the
argument from autonomy seems to run out. We can motivate treaty powers
from autonomy by analogy to Fried’s account of contracts as promising;62
but this tells us nothing about our pre-contractual rights and obligations.63
This seems unsatisfactory given the history and contemporary practice of
self-determination. External self-determination is commonly regarded as
56 On the limits of democracy in justifying borders, see A. Abizadeh, ‘Democratic Theory and
Border Coercion’ (2008) 36 Political Theory 37; Margalit and Raz, n 42 above, 455–456.
57 Philpott, n 48 above, 363. cf Margalit and Raz, ibid, 456. In the trade context this is recog-
nized, see J. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 59; R. Howse, ‘Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in
International Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence’ in J. H. H. Weiler (ed), The
EU, the WTO, and the : Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 67.
58 See, generally, Philpott, n 48 above, 362. cf S. Fine, ‘Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer’
(2010) 120 Ethics 338, 345.
59 For my views on the scope of those rights, see Suttle, n 1 above. Readers need not share those
views to accept the point here. The problem will arise for any view acknowledging the moral
standing of outsiders.
60 Moore includes some choices about land use and property regimes in this category: M. Moore,
‘Natural Resources, Territorial Right, and Global Distributive Justice’ (2012) 40 Political Theory
84, 87.
61 Put otherwise, it explains Westphalian Sovereignty, but not International Legal Sovereignty:
S. D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)
14.
62 C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Oxford: OUP, 1981). Simmons
labels this the ‘federative’ power, see Simmons, n 47 above, 306.
63 On the distinction: H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 The Philosophical
Review 175.
C© 2017 The Author. The Modern Law Review C© 2017 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2017) 80(4) MLR 569–599 581
A Liberal Cosmopolitan Approach to Article XX GATT
fundamental; and the establishment of an independent foreign policy has
been a key step for post-colonial states in asserting their independence.64 The
intrinsic argument cannot, then, be the whole of self-determination. But if
such claims cannot be grounded in autonomy, how should we understand
them?
EXPRESSIVE ARGUMENTS
The second category noted above is expressive arguments, including in par-
ticular arguments from fairness and equality. These neither ascribe intrinsic
value to self-determination nor claim it serves instrumentally to advance some
other value. Rather, they claim that according self-determination to particular
populations expresses or respects some other value that, while not comprised
in self-determination, is connected to it.65 Unfortunately, while providing
more guidance than intrinsic arguments on the powers falling under self-
determination, they remain inadequate for our purposes.
What does an expressive argument look like? Consider, first, colonial peo-
ples. Their colonial status might substantially undermine their autonomy,
grounding an intrinsic argument for self-determination. However, in many
cases colonial peoples were accorded substantial self-government, particularly
in respect of matters that were ‘truly [their] own’. We might imagine a par-
ticularly restrained imperialist affording self-government in all matters where
the intrinsic argument uncontroversially applies, controlling only foreign and
defence policies. While the intrinsic argument would not apply, we would
presumably still regard the situation as unjust. The explanation, on the expres-
sive account, is that external control over foreign and defence policy is unfair,
denying the equality of peoples.66
This argument does not identify any intrinsic value in self-determination. It is
compatible with a world where no people is self-determining, or where peoples
exercise limited self-determination, provided the limits are fair having regard
to those imposed on others. However, it challenges any arrangement whereby
some peoples’ self-determination is limited, while others’ is not. It need not
condemn this; countervailing concerns might trump self-determination claims
of some peoples but not others. But such unequal self-determination is at least
prima facie objectionable.
This might suggest the expressive argument was silent on the content of self-
determination. Provided it is equal, it may be more or less restricted without
64 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 73.
65 For example, J. Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of Self-Determination’ in Besson and Tasioulas
(eds), n 17 above, 399. cf C. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) ch 3.
66 Elements of this idea appear in D. Copp, ‘Democracy and Communal Self-Determination’ in
McKim and McMahan (eds), n 52 above, 292; D. Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’ in
M. Moore (ed), National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford: OUP, 1998) 83. cf I. Berlin,
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in H. Hardy and R. Hausheer (eds), The Proper Study of Mankind: An
Anthology of Essays (London: Chatto & Windus, 1997) 226.
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objection. However, the requirement of equality itself generates limits in at
least two circumstances.
First, the expressive argument can directly condemn measures whereby
one people exercises power over another. This, recall, is the objection to
colonialism. Where one people makes choices for another, it necessarily ex-
presses the disrespect that this argument addresses.67
Second, consider the claim that small and developing states are more exposed
than others to developments in international markets and the international
system. This might reflect their reliance on export earnings, international capital
markets or foreign investors;68 or perverse incentives international law poses
for domestic institutions.69 In either case, the objection is in terms of equal self-
determination. It is not simply that the relevant states are subject to external
influences. All states in an interdependent world are subject to such influences.
Rather, the objection is that they aremore exposed to such influences than larger
and more developed states. Formal equality obscures substantively unequal
freedom.70
Of course, given the inevitable – and not necessarily objectionable – facts
of states’ varying sizes and economic endowments, some inequalities of this
kind are inevitable. Any view condemning all such inequalities would thus
struggle for practical relevance. That does not dispense with this argument,
however. Rather than focusing on all such inequalities, we might look for
some minimum threshold for regarding a state as self-determining in this sense.
If we can then say, not that one people is more self-determining than another,
but rather that one enjoys self-determination while the other does not, then
the expressive argument can be invoked. However, we must look elsewhere to
identify this threshold
The expressive argument, then, has some relevance for our inquiry, but
like the intrinsic argument, it cannot explain which powers a people must
exercise for themselves in order to be self-determining. We therefore turn
to a third cluster of arguments, which identify an instrumental value in
self-determination.
INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENTS
Instrumental arguments defend self-determination as making more likely the
sustainable realisation of some other good to which it is causally linked. It is
67 Of course, identifying when this is the case requires a further argument, which I do not attempt
to provide here. Elements of an answer appear in Suttle, n 1 above.
68 F. Garcia, ‘Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the DevelopingWorld’ (2000) 21Michigan
Journal of International Law 975, 987; M. Ronzoni, ‘Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and
Their Implications for Global Institutional Design’ (2012) 15 Critical Review of International Social
and Political Philosophy 573; Margalit and Raz, n 42 above, 441; O. O’Neill Bounds of Justice
(Cambridge: CUP, 2000) 140.
69 T. Pogge, ‘Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor’ (2011) 14 Yale Hum Rts
& Dev LJ 1, 29.
70 Ronzoni, n 68 above, 581; S. Loriaux, ‘Fairness in International Economic Cooperation:Moving
Beyond Rawls’s Duty of Assistance’ (2012) 15 Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy 19, 28.
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here that we find the clearest guidance on the content of the powers required
to be exercised by a self-determining state. A number of distinct instrumental
arguments might be advanced. I here consider the four most prominent.
A number of broadly nationalist thinkers advance instrumental arguments
for self-determination as protecting national cultures.71 These depend on a
prior claim about the value of such cultures for persons. Margalit and Raz,
for example, argue that culture is a pre-requisite to our forming and pursuing
worthwhile goals and relationships, which are in turn understood as essential
components of wellbeing.72 To the extent this is the case, persons have a fun-
damental interest in the continued flourishing of the cultures into which they
are born, and in their adherence thereto. Protecting that continued flourishing
may in turn require that the relevant group enjoy ‘political sovereignty’ over its
own affairs.73
This protective argument suggests possible boundaries on the rights it will
justify. If self-determination is understood as protecting a group’s culture then
it must accord to peoples at least such powers as are necessary to do that.74
This might seem to substitute one ill-defined term (‘culture’) for another (‘self-
determination’).75 However, by explaining why culture is valued, namely as a
context for individuals to form and pursue goals and relationships, it suggests
some possible boundaries on that concept. In particular, it suggests that the
culture requiring protection is that which exists within the territory of the
relevant state, in so far as it is there that goals and relationships are formed
and pursued. This will not always be the case. We can imagine peoples whose
encompassing culture was expressed externally, and for whom that external
expression was valuable in the sense invoked by Margalit and Raz.76 However,
we might doubt whether, even in these cases, the fact of external expression,
as opposed to the aspiration, was valuable in the relevant sense. There are also
obvious fairness problems with such externally expressed cultures: if the only
way one people can maintain its valued culture is through seeking to change
others’, then such a culture may simply be incompatible with the equality of
peoples.77 An analogy can be drawn to individual conceptions of the good that
deny the equal claim of others to pursue their own conceptions.78 We need
71 Gans, n 65 above, ch 2; K. Nielsen, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Secession’ in Moore (ed), n 66
above, 121; Tamir, n 52 above, 69; Miller, n 43 above, 85.
72 Margalit and Raz, n 42 above, 448.
73 This argument is not limited to a distinctively national culture. It depends only on being attached
to some culture: McMahan, n 52 above, 121, Gans, n 65 above, 42. However, a further set of
identity-based arguments pre-empt the objection that any culture, and not only persons’ original
culture, will suffice for this purpose: Miller, n 43 above, 86;W. KymlickaMulticultural Citizenship:
A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 84.
74 Miller tentatively distinguishes the implications of this argument for social, economic and defence
powers: Miller, ibid, 100.
75 Thus Miller assumes the powers required will vary with the relevant culture. Gans argues this
justifies protecting cultures, but not individual practices within cultures, see Gans, n 65 above,
55 et seq.
76 For example, A. MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’ The Lindley Lecture (Lawrence, KS: Uni-
versity of Kansas, 1984) 7.
77 It may also conflict with the expressive argument for self-determination.
78 For a similar point, T. Hurka, ‘The Justification of National Partiality’ in McKim and McMahan
(eds), n 52 above.
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not deny that peoples can have reasons to pursue changes in the cultures and
practices of others; but this cannot be justified solely through the instrumental
value for them of preserving their own encompassing culture. Something more
than self-determination is required.
There is a second, less culturally focused, protective argument. Margalit and
Raz locate the value of culture in its stabilising role. However, for persons to
form and pursue goals and relationships, more than a stable culture is required.
They also require a stable institutional, political and economic environment.79
Consider, for example, the choice of career, which will often have pervasive
effects on a person’s life. While stability may not be a prerequisite to choice,
relative stability is a plausible prerequisite to meaningful choice. If I choose to
pursue an academic career, for example, that choice may be frustrated if, some
years later, all the universities in my country close. This is likely significantly
to impair both my material wellbeing and my sense of autonomy. We need
not suppose that I have any right to pursue any particular career, or indeed to
continue in my chosen career, to recognise the value that a stable context of
choice offers for individuals.80 What is at issue here is not the range or quality
of choices available, but rather their stability. How much stability is required
is an open question. Some risk is presumably inevitable, and need not prevent
individuals taking control over and responsibility for their own lives. Further,
some individuals may flourish in uncertain environments, while others prefer
stability. More generally, at a societal level stability may be valuable, to the
extent that it protects expectations; but it may also be costly, stifling innovation
and restricting opportunities, particularly for new participants. While there
is no logical necessity that stability be protected locally, the value judgments
required, as well as informational considerations, suggest this is better done
here than internationally. Instrumental and intrinsic arguments thus converge
to suggest that peoples should have the powers necessary to maintain this
stability.81 However, this argument is similarly subject to fairness constraints. A
people cannot expect both perfect stability domestically, and reliable access to
the international economy, with implications for the stability of others.
A third instrumental argument emphasises the role of the state in providing
public goods, including in particular security of persons and property. We la-
bel as ‘failed’ states that cannot provide physical security for their populations.
However, the concern here is broader. States provide diverse public goods, in-
cluding security, stability, cultural protection and political and socio-economic
79 Theorists of embedded liberalism emphasise this aspect: K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation :
The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2nd ed, 2001) passim,
esp ch 12, 18 and 21; J. G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embed-
ded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’ (1982) 36 International Organization 379, 386;
Lang, n 31 above, 190. Cottier argues such stabilising mechanisms are pre-requisites to success-
ful liberalisation: T. Cottier, ‘Poverty, Redistribution, and International Trade Regulation’ in
K. N. Schefer (ed), Poverty and the International Economic Legal Sytem: Duties to the World’s Poor
(Cambridge: CUP, 2013).
80 On the perils of ignoring these concerns with commodity labor, see Polanyi, n 79 above, 76.
81 The assumption that stability is best provided domestically may also reflect the extent to which
we have come to identify the trade regime with unregulated markets, eliding earlier assumptions
about the role of social order in international trade regulation.
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justice, including the protection of basic rights.82 For various reasons, it makes
sense to provide such goods at the level of individual political communities.83
Their value lies in their provision to individuals; but they also constitute plausi-
ble prerequisites to individuals enjoying the benefits of being self-determining,
as that concept is understood by the other arguments. To the extent this is the
case, the capacity to make and implement choices about such goods is itself a
necessary element of self-determination.
A fourth instrumental argument highlights the role of peoples as custodians
of territories, and of their resources. Two separate arguments might be made.
The first parallels Hume’s consequentialist argument for property. It claims that
resources will be better managed, to the benefit of all, if they are controlled by
particular peoples.84 The second highlights the importance of natural resources
for other aspects of self-determination, including autonomy and cultural sta-
bility.85 Peoples who control territories and resources are more secure in their
enjoyment of these goods.86 Control of territory and resources is therefore a
necessary element of self-determination.
What these instrumental arguments share is the claim that particular goods
are better realised at local rather than global levels. There are presumably others
that might be proposed, but these suffice for our purposes. What do they imply
about the scope of the rights required for a people to be self-determining?
A people must be able to provide the goods highlighted by each argument:
to protect and develop its distinctive culture, to the extent this is valuable for its
members; to stabilise institutions, politics and markets to the extent necessary
for persons to make meaningful choices; to make and implement choices about
the provision of public goods; and to manage the natural resources that provide
the material basis for all of the above.
One potential instrumental argument must be rejected, however. This is
the claim that peoples must necessarily judge for themselves what measures are
required under any of these arguments. The claim to self-judgment is generally
advanced in instrumental terms. In its simplest form, it simply restates Hobbes’
82 This includes what Buchanan labels ‘distributional autonomy’: A. Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of
Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World’ (2000) 110 Ethics 697, 705.
83 Kratochwil identifies the failure to provide these as stimulating the transition from feudal to
territorial sovereignty. Ronzoni and Dietsch make similar points in advocating moves towards
cooperative sovereignty. Kolers examines a number of arguments for defining state borders by
reference to the efficient scope of public goods. F. Kratochwil, ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and
Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System’ (1986) 39 World Politics 27;
Ronzoni, n 68 above; P. Dietsch, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in International Fiscal Policy’ (2011)
37 Review of International Studies 2107; A. Kolers, ‘Justice, Territory and Natural Resources’
(2012) 60 Political Studies 269, 34.
84 Rawls adopts a version of this view: J. Rawls The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1999) 38.
85 See, on the link between self-determination and sovereignty over resources, Kratochwil, n 83
above, 42.
86 Moore labels this the ‘standard view’ of territorial rights: Moore, n 60 above, 85. cf Kolers,
n 83 above; C. Armstrong, ‘Resources, Rights and Global Justice: A Response to Kolers’ (2013)
62 Political Studies 216.
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argument against trust in a state of nature:87 if the values protected by self-
determination have overriding importance then peoples must exercise these
powers securely, which requires having the final say on whether they require to
be exercised.88 The argument is vulnerable to the same challenge commonly
offered to Hobbesian realists: in most cases there is little reason to think, and
much reason to doubt, that peoples will be more secure in their rights if each
claims a privilege to determine for itself what this requires.89 There is, however,
a moderate form of this argument that we can accept. This is the claim that, in
many cases, peoples are best placed to determine what is required to protect the
goods underpinning self-determination. The specific content of those goods
will vary across peoples; in a number of cases, that variation is the reason
self-determination is valued. In consequence, members of a community have
epistemic advantages in determining their relative importance, and the measures
required to protect them.90 This, however, is compatible with international
review of the self-determination justifications that states offer.
RECONSTRUCTING SELF-DETERMINATION IN TRADE
REGULATION
The intrinsic, expressive and instrumental arguments each provide different
accounts of the minimum powers a people requires in order to be self-
determining. We need not adjudicate between them; we might consistently
hold that peoples have an intrinsic claim to exercise some powers, expressive
claims to others, and instrumental claims to others again.91 By integrating the
three approaches, we can derive a general account of self-determination for the
purposes of the GATT. This suggests two main ways self-determination might
be relevant.
The first concerns powers essential to the self-determination of the regulating
people, and relies predominantly on instrumental arguments. The scope of the
measures it justifies depends on the scope of those instrumental arguments, but
runs at least to measures necessary to protect the various goods noted above. To
the extent that a measure is required for these purposes, it is justified under self-
determination. To the extent it goes further, whether because it pursues another
goal, or is unnecessary to the particular goal pursued, it requires justification
in other terms. There are reasons to defer to peoples in drawing this line, but
the line is defined by objective justification, not subjective choice. Instrumental
87 Hobbes himself regards adjudication as an essential element of sovereignty, and the impossibility
of alienating it as an argument against limited government. T. Hobbes Leviathan (R. Tuck ed)
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996) 124.
88 cf MacIntyre, n 76 above.
89 This does not mean that we must reason from global justice to domestic limits, but only that the
limits of self-determination must be defined for the international context. cf Miller, Citizenship
and National Identity n 52 above, 167.
90 Margalit and Raz, n 42 above, 457; Dietsch, n 83 above, 2114. We see elements of this idea in
the public morals case-law discussed in the penultimate section below.
91 Philpott, n 66 above, 82.
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arguments do most of the work in fleshing out this aspect of self-determination.
Expressive and intrinsic arguments play a supporting role.
The second concerns shared goals and standards. I noted above that the
intrinsic argument tells us little about peoples’ claims to determine matters
affecting others. Its one implication for external polices was in justifying a
treaty power or, more generally, a power of peoples to commit themselves to
particular goals. This need not take the form of legal commitments: just as
promising is wider than contracting, there are many ways peoples can commit
themselves to shared standards, goals and projects. Such commitments provide
a plausible basis, grounded in the intrinsic argument, for justifying measures
in pursuit of such standards, goals and projects.92 That justification reflects the
self-determination of both the regulating people and the affected outsiders.
These arguments also imply clear limits. Self-determination cannot be in-
voked to justify every policy that a people wishes to adopt. It is only where that
policy falls under one of the specific arguments outlined above that justification
under self-determination is available. This distinguishes this approach from eco-
nomic approaches discussed earlier. It also substantially ameliorates problems
of conflicting invocations of self-determination, providing a route whereby
particular issues can be located within the domains of particular peoples.
Understanding self-determination in these terms can illuminate a number
of areas of WTO law where conventional economic approaches struggle. For
example, it suggests an account of trade remedies disciplines, which have resisted
economic explanation. It has implications for the SPS and TBT agreements, and
the scope of regulatory autonomy thereunder. However, for present purposes,
the most significant implication of this account of self-determination is in
explaining the various exceptions in the GATT, and in particular Article XX.93
Articles XX(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (i) and (j) can each be understood as express-
ing, to varying degrees, the first aspect of self-determination above. Consider:
if public morals are understood as relating to a community’s shared life and
public culture, rather than its judgment of outsiders, their protection becomes
central to the instrumental approach.94 The capacity to protect human, animal
and plant life is similarly necessary for regarding a people as self-determining on
that view. This is clearest for human life; but protecting animal and plant life,
as important parts of the physical and social fabric of a community, may also be
essential to sustaining self-determination. Controls on the import and export
of precious metals and the exploitation of natural resources, price stabilisation
measures, and controls on trade in essential products in short supply can all be
understood as necessary, particularly for smaller and less resilient economies,
to maintain effective control over economic development and ensure equitable
distribution amongst domestic constituencies.95 Finally, the capacity to ensure
92 Internationally the pervasive possibility of coercion means care is required in identifying whether
and to what extent goals are in fact shared by relevant peoples.
93 On the implications elsewhere in the trade regime: Suttle, n 30 above.
94 As in, for example, Miller, n 43 above, 24. The protection of national treasures is similarly
relevant here, as well as to the idea of nations as trans-historical communities: ibid, 23; Gans, n
65 above, 49-58.
95 In each case the paragraphs’ provisos emphasise that self-determination cannot be purchased
at the expense of other peoples. Consider, for example, the AB’s suggestion that the proviso
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compliance with domestic laws is a sine qua non of political self-determination.
If a people cannot effectively implement their collective choices, as expressed
through their political process, then self-determination becomes illusory.96 If
domestic choice is pre-empted by international factors, then both intrinsic
and expressive arguments imply a claim to insulate the domestic from the
international to the extent necessary to make that choice possible.97
The second aspect is expressed in Article XX(a), (b), (e), (g) and (h). This list
overlaps with that in the previous paragraph. For example public morals, while
reflecting the shared life of a community domestically, can also be understood
in global terms, as expressing judgments of right conduct shared by peoples
generally.98 The protection of human, animal, and plant life might also be un-
derstood in terms of shared goals, particularly where states act to protect these
values outside their borders. Controls on the products of prison industry might
be understood as reflecting a collective recognition of their moral complex-
ity. Finally, the conservation of exhaustible natural resources is the archetypal
global common concern.99 Again, this problem looks different internally and
externally. The conservation of a state’s own resources is essential to effective
self-determination, under both instrumental and intrinsic approaches.100 Con-
cern for resources elsewhere, whether in others’ territories or the global com-
mons, requires justification in other terms. Global environmental degradation
may undermine states’ capacity for self-determination but this has not been
the sole focus of such concerns.101 Rather, global environmental arguments
typically bifurcate into anthropocentric and transcendental claims. The former
evoke the value of environmental resources for human persons and peoples;
while the latter evoke the inherent value of nature, biodiversity, or particular
animal and plant species.102 To the extent environmental measures addressing
global commons are anthropocentric, they are also frequently distributive; they
protect the value for some of conserving resources, at the expense of the value
for others of exploiting them.103 Measures pursuing such distributive concerns
to Art XX(g) expresses a concern for even-handedness: US-Gasoline (Appellate Body Report),
21. cf China-Rare Earths (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS431/AB/R, §5.123-5.136. A similar
analysis applies to safeguards under Article XIX.
96 Recall Miller’s image of nations as communities ‘active in character’, Miller, n 43 above, 24.
97 Note, however, that it is domestic choice, not international relations, that is protected: Mexico-
Soft Drinks (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS308/AB/R, §75.
98 I discuss this point further in the next section.
99 On the link between cooperation and international conservation, see S. Charnovitz, ‘Exploring
the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX’ (1991) 25 Journal of World Trade 37, 52-
53. Interestingly, in tracing the move from cooperative to unilateral conservation measures,
Charnovitz highlights cases where the relevant harms (over-fishing, ozone depletion) redound
to the regulating state.
100 On both the relation between natural resources and self-determination, and the inherent limits
of this argument, see China-Rare Earths (Appellate Body Report), §7.261-277.
101 To the extent global commons problems are understood in these terms, response may be
justified under the first limb. Anthropogenic climate change seems a plausible candidate.Whether
responses are best justified under the first or second aspects depends on the implications for
effective self-determination of both regulating and third states.
102 O. O’Neill, ‘Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism’ (1997) 6 Environmental
Values 127, 127.
103 ibid, 130.
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cannot be justified directly under self-determination.104 Conversely, arguments
in transcendental terms rely on contestable value claims, which we cannot as-
sume are shared; the fact that a regulating people values these constitutes no
justification to others. However, to the extent conservation reflects a collective
political choice amongst relevant peoples, we may justify measures to protect
resources in the territories of those peoples, or in the global commons, under
this second aspect of self-determination.105
The Article XX chapeau plays two roles on this account.
The first, policing the intrusion of extrinsic considerations, has been most
prominent in the case-law. In Gasoline, Tyres and Seals, the chapeau analy-
sis focused on whether discrimination tracked the exempted interest or other,
extrinsic, considerations.106 The account above suggests self-determination jus-
tifies measures in pursuit of relatively narrow goals. It is therefore important
that measures in fact pursue those goals, and are not tailored to advance others.
The second, suggested by the AB in Shrimp, is a substantive review of
the justifiability of measures, and a balancing of the rights of members.107
This will be most relevant under the second aspect of self-determination.
In Shrimp, particularly in discussing coercion and negotiations, the AB goes
beyond whether extrinsic considerations intrude, to inquire how far the goals
pursued are in fact shared, and whether they are pursued in a reasonable manner,
having regard to the claims of outsiders. The fact that a category of goal (public
morals, conservation of resources) is mentioned in Article XX does not answer
whether the particular standard invoked is one to which affected outsiders have
committed themselves. This is precisely the analysis implied by the second
aspect above.
PUBLIC MORALS, PUBLIC CULTURE AND SHARED GOALS
We can thus move from an account of the value of self-determination to an
account of Article XX. This in turn has implications for how we interpret
both Article XX’s individual paragraphs, and the chapeau. Those implications
will vary from paragraph to paragraph, a conclusion reflected the AB’s own
approach.108 In this penultimate section, I therefore examine the implications
for one specific exemption, public morals under Article XX(a).
As noted, public morals are potentially relevant under both aspects of self-
determination. I therefore start by introducing a number of unanswered ques-
tions in the Article XX(a) case-law, before showing how my dual account
104 There might, of course, be other globalist justifications available (although I have elsewhere
argued there are not).
105 The chapeau can be read as tracking these concerns: US-Shrimp (Appellate Body Report),
§156,159.
106 The analysis of arbitrariness in Tyres is particularly expressive of this concern: concern: Brazil-
Tyres (Appellate Body Report), §224-252.
107 US-Shrimp (Appellate Body Report), §159.
108 ibid §120.
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of self-determination suggests these be answered.109 These include the exact
nature of public morals, and what it means to protect them. These are ques-
tions that the AB itself seems reluctant to address, preferring to focus on more
familiar issues of necessity and arbitrariness. In the second half of this section
I therefore examine how far the AB’s approach to these latter issues in fact
depends on answers to the former questions, and how addressing these more
directly might affect that approach.
The first question is how we define, and identify, public morals. In the three
cases –Gambling, Audiovisual and Seals – that have considered public morals, the
same formulation is adopted, describing them as ‘standards of right and wrong
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation’.110 Further,
the Panel in Gambling, in reasoning endorsed by the AB in Seals, observed that
‘content of [public morals] for Members can vary in time and space, depending
upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious
values’, and that accordingly members should be given ‘some scope to define
and apply for themselves the concepts of “public morals” . . . in their respective
territories, according to their own systems and scales of values’.111 The most
obvious interpretation of these remarks is that public morals are cultural or
sociological facts, characteristics of particular populations or communities.112
So conceived, they exist independent of the political acts of that community.113
Members’ political organs are not free, on this view, to determine the content
of their own public morals. Rather, public morals are prior to political choice.
However members have epistemic advantages identifying their own public
morals, so some deference to their judgment is appropriate.
An alternative interpretation understands public morals as political facts,
expressing a community’s collective choices through its political organs.114
It is through joint political action that the distinct moral commitments of
individuals become the shared public morals of a community.115 The standard
from which members enjoy some scope for departure then becomes, not the
sociological consensus of the first interpretation, but rather an internationally
109 As well as the WTO case-law, I note below some answers to these questions in other contexts.
However differences across contexts and the variety of answers offered precludes drawing any
direct lessons from these, and I make no claim to provide a systematic doctrinal account of these
issues as they arise elsewhere.
110 EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS400/AB/R, §5.199.
111 US-Gambling (Panel Report) WT/285/R, §6.461, approved in EC-Seals (Appellate Body Re-
port) §5.199.
112 For this approach, see Marwell, n 3 above, 824-826; T. Perisˇin, ‘Is the EU Seal Products
Regulation a Sealed Deal? EU and WTO Challenges’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 373, 394. On the ambiguities in the AB’s approach to this point, see Wu, n 3
above, 233.
113 This conception of public morals appears in certain ECHR case-law: For example,
Case 13470/87 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34, ECLI:CE:ECHR:
1994:0920JUD001347087, §50.
114 A unilateral form of this interpretation is defended in Howse, Langille and Sykes, n 3 above.
For criticisms of such purely political domestic conceptions, see Du, n 3 above, 692-694.
115 The ECJ adopts this interpretation in Case 34/79 R v Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795,
ECLI:EU:C:1979:295, §17.
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shared standard of public morals.116 This latter interpretation is supported by
references, in both Gambling and Seals, to evidence of international concerns
about the relevant moral issues.117
It is worth emphasising here what public morals in WTO discourse are not
about, namely the truth or otherwise of the underlying moral claims. When we
argue about public morality, we argue about the claim of particular communities
to have, or to choose, their own standards, rather than about the validity of
those standards in any deeper metaphysical sense.118 In consequence, when we
invoke public morals, our claim is not that particular conduct is immoral as a
matter of objective fact; we claim only that it is immoral by the standards that
obtain around here. Our claim is thus about which standards should apply, in
circumstances where standards vary across disputing members.119
The second question is what is means to ‘protect’ public morals. Again,
there are a number of ways we might understand this.120 The first understands
public morals as the moral qualities of individual members of the public. On
this interpretation, we protect public morals by protecting the public from im-
moral behavior.121 If we understand particular conduct, or particular products
(alcohol, narcotics, pornography) as tending to debase or pollute those engaged
with them, then restricting that conduct, or those products, will in turn protect
public morality.122
A second interpretation understands public morals as qualities of a particular
community. Recalling the language favored by the AB, these are the standards
of right and wrong conduct maintained by that community. So understood,
public morals are social conventions, part of the public culture of the relevant
community; and we protect public morals by protecting their status as such,
and the community’s relation to them.123
116 Such an international sense of public morals appears in: Charnovitz, n 3 above, 742; Wu, n 3
above. It is reflected in the ECtHR’s more recent margin of appreciation jurisprudence, which
compares a member’s public morals with those obtaining in the membership as a whole: S. Dolle´
and C. Ovey, ‘Handyside, 35 Years down the road’ in J. Casadevall, E. Myjer, M. O’Boyle and
A. Austin (eds), Freedom of Expression Essays in honour of Nicolas Bratza (Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal
Publishers, 2012).
117 US-Gambling (Panel Report), §6.471-6.473; EC-Seals (Panel Report) WT/DS400/R, §7.292.
Admittedly, it is not clear how much weight these international factors carry, beyond confirming
conclusions already reached based on domestic considerations. For a reading of the Seals dispute
emphasising this international aspect: Sykes, n 8 above. On the challenges of either a purely
global or purely local definition: Wu, n 3 above, 231.
118 Some commentators seem to overlook this point. For example, A. Herwig, ‘Too Much Zeal on
Seals? Animal Welfare, Public Morals, and Consumer Ethics at the Bar of the WTO’ (2016) 15
World Trade Review 109, 120.
119 This characteristic role of disagreement distinguishes public morals in Article XX(a) from similar
concepts in human rights treaties, where morals are invoked to balance rights, rather than to
settle inter-community disagreement. For an interesting effort to capture the idea of morals at
their most general, see Howse, Langille and Sykes, n 3 above, 95.
120 For a somewhat different classification, see Charnovitz, n 3 above, 692.
121 See, for example, ibid, 692.
122 This sense of protection is evident in the ECtHR’s decision in Case 5493/72 R v Handyside
(1976) 1 EHRR 737, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, §52.
123 Howse and Langille’s emphasis on the ‘expressive’ function of law reflects something like
this understanding: Howse and Langille, n 11 above, 372. The ECtHR’s understanding
of blasphemy arguably reflects this idea: see, for example, Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria
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A third interpretation equates protecting public morals with protecting the
values or interests that those morals identify. It reads ‘protecting’ as ‘enforcing’,
or perhaps ‘vindicating’, implying that any measure enforcing compliance with
a moral standard, or preventing a moral harm, thereby protects public morals.
It is under this third interpretation that issues of extraterritoriality most readily
arise.124
The WTO cases invoke elements of each interpretation. Gambling expresses
elements of the first, referring to links between gambling, addiction and social
dysfunction.125 Audiovisual is concerned with the second, focusing on the
protection of the prevailing cultural standards in the regulating member.126
And the AB in Seals seems clearly to have accepted the third, eliding any
distinctions between protecting public morals and pursuing moral goals.127
How can thinking about public morals in terms of self-determination help
resolve these interpretive questions? As noted, public morals seem relevant
under both aspects of self-determination. However, they have quite different
implications under each. The first aspect is concerned with the minimum
powers peoples require to be effectively self-determining, which include the
power to protect and develop their own distinctive public cultures. It is within
those cultures that persons develop and exercise their capacities for autonomous
choice. In many cases, shared moral standards will be part of that shared culture.
Part of what it means for a particular community to be one in which members
can feel at home is their being able to endorse, or at least recognise, the values
it expresses. There may therefore be measures that a state can legitimately take
to protect and promote those shared values.
If this is the function of Article XX(a), it has a number of implications.
First, the public morals to which it refers are those in fact shared within the
relevant public culture. The test is local and sociological. It is concerned with a
community’s capacity to protect a particular aspect of its shared cultural life, not
its capacity of make and implement collective moral choices, or the justifiability
of those choices by any outside standard.128
n 113 above, §56; Case 17419/90 Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 1,
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:1125JUD001741990, §57-58. The protection of morals as public stan-
dards might indeed be particularly relevant in the context of restrictions on expression generally.
124 This is the understanding implicitly adopted by Advocate General Le´ger in Case 1/96 R v
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p Compassion in World Farming [1998] ECR I-1251,
ECLI:EU:C:1997:365, Advocate General’s Opinion, §90-91. Much of the academic literature
assumes this interpretation, a feature challenged by Howse and Langille. For various attempts
to distinguish the inward and outward aspects of public morals on this interpretation, see Wu,
n 3 above, 235; Charnovitz, n 3 above, 695; M. Du, ‘Permitting Moral Imperialism? The Public
Morals Exception to Free Trade at the Bar of the World Trade Organization’ (2016) 50 Journal
of World Trade 675, 699-702.
125 US-Gambling (Panel Report), §6.457, §6.463-6.465, §6.469-6.473; (Appellate Body Report)
WT/DS285/AB/R, §296.
126 China-Audiovisual Materials (Panel Report) WT/DS363/AB/R, §7.751-7.763.
127 EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.196-5.199.
128 An alternative intrinsic argument might be made for understanding such morals politically, sug-
gesting that making choices about what things are like ‘around here’, including about prevailing
public morality, falls within the minimum required for peoples to regard themselves as authors
of their shared lives. I am doubtful how attractive this argument is once distinguished from
the instrumental claim, particularly from a liberal perspective. In any event, the limitations of
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Second, it is concerned with protecting the relevant moral standards, as
cultural objects and aspects of a social environment, rather than with vindi-
cating the particular moral claims those standards express. It is not clear what
might be required to do this, but it is unlikely to require strict compliance
or enforcement. Some moralities may have this structure; but for others un-
punished violations might provide opportunities for discursive reinforcement
of the community’s relation to the relevant standard.129 This will be a matter
of cultural interpretation in particular cases. Regardless, it seems clear that the
mere fact of immorality elsewhere, or of ‘moral harms’ per se, are not relevant
here.
Third, and related, this argument raises particular challenges for liberal states,
for whom protecting moral standards as such runs contrary to a fundamental
political commitment to individual liberty. This reflects the point, in the pre-
vious paragraph, about the structure of particular moralities. A key feature of
the public moralities of liberal states is their acceptance of pluralism, with a
consequent commitment to refrain from legally enforcing moral standards as
such.130
Turning to the second aspect, which is concerned with shared goals, and the
ways these are manifested in particular cases. There is no reason these shared
goals cannot include distinctively moral ones. Many international institutions
and initiatives – the suppression of the slave trade, the practice of human
rights – are clearly morally motivated. A number of states, acting together,
might jointly commit themselves to advancing a particular moral cause; and
that commitment might in turn justify measures advancing that cause, under
the self-determination of both regulating and affected states.
What implications does this have? First, unlike the first aspect, it suggests
public morals be understood politically rather than sociologically. This limb,
recall, derives from a concern with collective autonomy, and the ways that
autonomy is extended through adhesion to shared goals and projects. Autonomy
is the capacity to make and act on choices, which would be pre-empted if
public morals were limited to existing social understandings. Indeed many of
the practices that might fall under this limb, including international human
rights, are themselves progressive, part of a process whereby states make choices
about the kinds of values they should have.
Second, we are concerned not with the choices of individual communities,
but rather with their shared goals and projects. I noted earlier the limits of
intrinsic arguments from autonomy in justifying measures affecting outsiders;
but where those outsiders have committed themselves to the relevant goals
and projects, this objection falls away. The upshot is that we should look
the intrinsic argument seem clearly to apply if it is extended to choices about the conduct of
outsiders.
129 The possibility of such discursive reinforcement features prominently in the Hart/Devlin debate,
and in Mill’s defence of free speech on which Hart draws.
130 See, for example, I. Kant Political Writings H. B. Nisbet (trans), H. S. Reiss (ed) (Cambridge:
CUP, 1991) 73; J. S. MillOn Liberty (1989) 15; H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford,
Ca: Stanford University Press, 1963).
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to international standards, whether formal or informal, in identifying public
morals under this aspect.131
Third, we are not limited to protecting public morals as cultural artifacts.
Rather, the projects to which we are jointly committed may include the pro-
motion, or prevention, of particular practices, or particular moral harms or
values. To the extent we are jointly committed to realising a particular moral
goal, we cannot object to measures pursuing that goal. Under this limb, then,
protection is closer to enforcement or vindication.
We thus derive, from an account of self-determination, two quite different
approaches to public morals. One is local and cultural, the other international
and political. Interpreting public morals in terms of self-determination suggests
being sensitive to the particular structure of the moral justifications that states
offer in particular cases, to determine which aspect they fall under, and the
kinds of limits this implies. Where a state invokes local values, it suggests
examining the extent to which those values in fact form part of the public
culture of that state, and limiting justification to measures required to protect
those values within the relevant community. Where, by contrast, measures
are concerned with preventing moral harms per se, and especially with moral
harms and behaviors outside the relevant community, it suggests looking to
shared standards, however evidenced, as a prerequisite to such justification.132
This, then, is how I suggest we understand public morals and their pro-
tection. As noted, the AB’s public morals jurisprudence has not focused on
these issues, preferring to emphasise questions of necessity and, under the
chapeau, arbitrariness. However, even a relatively cursory reading of the AB’s
approaches to these latter questions shows how far they are in turn shaped by
our understanding of the nature of both public morals and their protection.
Turning first to necessity. Before examining the cases, it is worth highlighting
the relational quality of necessity as a concept. In both legal and everyday
speech, necessity is not a feature that attaches to an object in itself. Rather, it
links two or more objects. Thus, an action is not necessary simpliciter. Rather,
it is necessary for some purpose. What is necessary depends on the nature of
that purpose. The obvious implication is that any answer to what is necessary
to protect public morals necessarily relies on some understanding, explicit or
implicit, of what public morals are, and what it means to protect them.
The AB’s established case-law approaches necessity in two ways. First, ne-
cessity is approached by ‘weighing and balancing’ three sets of factors: the
131 I assume here that we are looking to standards that are shared in the sense that these have been
endorsed by the peoples concerned. There may be standards, goals and projects that are shared
in the sense that peoples have reason to endorse them, even where they have not in fact done so,
perhaps for pragmatic or self-serving reasons. It may therefore be possible to look to values that
are widely endorsed globally, whether by peoples, or in political, ethical or religious cultures,
even where these have not been endorsed by the particular people concerned. This, however,
risks ignoring the extent to which reasons may in fact not be shared. I do not attempt to resolve
this problem here.
132 While the way the distinctions are drawn here does not map onto previous approaches, the idea
that different standards might be applicable depending on the sense of public morals in play is
not new, see Charnovitz, n 4 above, 730; Wu, n 4 above, 242. The idea that local sociological
and global political standards might constitute alternate grounds is advocated, albeit for other
reasons, in Du, n 124 above, 696-697.
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contribution made by the measure; the importance of the common interests
or values protected; and the measure’s restrictiveness. Second, necessity is un-
derstood by reference to the reasonably available alternative measures for the
achievement of the relevant goal. These elements are combined in various ways
at various times, but the basic elements remain relatively stable.133
However, the AB has struggled to apply this approach to public morals,
in part because of a lack of confidence on the two questions noted above.
Thus, in both Gambling and Seals, much of the AB’s necessity analysis exam-
ined the relation between the challenged measures and specific, measurable,
non-moral harms (problem gambling, organised crime, animal suffering). An
important consideration was thus whether the relevant measures were a more
effective remedy to those harms than reasonably available, and less trade restric-
tive, alternatives. This may frequently be a satisfactory approach, particularly
where – as in Gambling – these harms are the measure’s principal object. How-
ever, it involves adopting a proxy, rather than directly addressing the protection
of public morals. And in other cases, such as Seals, that proxy will cause serious
problems. This is because, in many cases, protecting public morals is more
about the relation between the community and its values, than it is about the
underlying harm itself.134
The problems with the AB’s approach are clearest, in Seals, in its treatment of
risk. Canada argued in that case, based on previous case-law, that the concept
of protection in Article XX was tied up with the idea of a risk, against which
it was sought to protect.135 Applying Article XX(b) thus required identifying a
standard of right and wrong, a risk to the interests identified by that standard,
and the relation between a challenged measure and that risk. The upshot of
doing this in Seals, Canada suggested, would be to recognise that seal-hunting
was only one, and a relatively minor, threat to the animal welfare interests iden-
tified by EU public morals. In consequence, it would be difficult to conclude
that the seal regime was necessary to protect public morals, having regard to
the less trade restrictive alternative measures that are reasonably available.
The AB, recognising that this approach would pose insuperable obstacles for
states invoking public morals in many cases, responded by effectively reading
out the concepts of protection and risk from Article XX(a), going so far as to
deny the need even to identify the content of the public morals invoked. The
consequence was that the AB effectively read ‘necessary to protect’ as ‘relating
to’, contradicting its own of settled case-law.136
There is an evident sensitivity in the AB’s discussion here to the risks of
overruling states’ judgments on public morals. It recognises, and rightly, the
133 For the classic statement of this approach, Korea-Beef (Appellate Body Report), §160-166. How-
ever, very similar analyses appear outside the GATT context, including under TBT, Article 2.2
and SPS, Article 5.6. On the former: US-Tuna II (Appellate Body Report) WT/DS381/AB/R,
§318-322.
134 This point is well made, albeit to a different purpose, in Howse and Langille, n 11 above, 371.
On the use of concrete harms as a proxy in US-Gambling, ibid 412-413.
135 EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.194.
136 ibid, §5.194-5.200. This runs contrary to an established line of AB jurisprudence emphasising
the difference between these two standards, for example, US-Gasoline (Appellate Body Report),
17-18.
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risk of requiring members to express, and live by, a single, consistent moral
standard on any issue. However, once having rejected this approach, it finds
no alternative means of assessing when action in pursuit of non-instrumental
moral goals is necessary to protect public morals. Without a clear answer
to what public morals are, and what is meant by protecting them, no such
means is available. Instead, the analysis moves quickly from the existence of a
moral standard around animal suffering, to the contribution of this measure to
alleviating the occurrence of suffering to the relevant animals, and the above
noted examination of necessity by proxy.137
How does the present argument suggest this issue be approached? First, as
outlined above, it suggests the need for greater clarity on both the content of
the relevant public morals, and the manner in which a measure seeks to protect
these. This may mean asking quite different questions, depending on the kind of
moral standards at stake. In Seals, it would include asking what was necessary to
protect the EU’s commitment to a standard of right and wrong that included
minimising animal suffering. This might lead into the kinds of consistency
analyses suggested by Canada; but it might equally include a recognition of
the variability of both the relevant standard, and the kinds of steps required to
protect it in various contexts. Even where a moral standard is uniform, the fact
of public attention to a particular violation may mean it constitutes a greater
threat than others; failing to act would then constitute a public abandonment
of that standard. Given that the standard invoked in Seals was at least in part
an internationally shared one, it might also involve examining the instrumental
question, of to what extent the relevant measure in fact served to protect
seals from suffering. However, importantly, this would not be the whole of
the necessity analysis. Because public morals have these two quite different
aspects, we may find elements of a measure that are unnecessary under one, but
necessary under the other. In consequence, while engaging more directly with
questions of the nature of public morals, and the reasons for their protection,
might seem to require tackling sensitive issues that the AB would rather avoid,
it may also in many cases allow it more effectively to preserve the freedom
of members to protect important public values. By focusing so heavily on the
instrumental question, the AB risks failing to do this.
A more explicit engagement with these questions would also facilitate a
more satisfactory analysis under the Article XX chapeau. In Seals, a major
focus of the chapeau analysis was whether the challenged discrimination was
rationally related to or reconcilable with the underlying objective, an apparent
relaxation of the rational relationship standard in Brazil-Tyres.138 This in turn led
the AB to two questions: first, whether and to what extent the IC and MRM
exceptions themselves pursued public moral goals, as opposed to reflecting non-
moral constraints on the pursuit of moral goals; and second, to what extent
137 This is true notwithstanding continuing references to a second public morals purpose, around
Europeans’ commercial participation in that suffering. See, for example, the way the AB elides
these two goals, prioritising the instrumental goal in EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.279.
138 While this shift is not explicitly acknowledged, it is evident from a comparison of, for example,
EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.306,320 §5.306,320 and Brazil-Tyres (Appellate Body
Report), §227, 228.
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the existence of these exceptions undermined the realisation of the measure’s
moral objectives.
On the former question, the AB’s analysis is complicated somewhat by a
distinction between whether the IC andMRM exceptions constitute objectives
of the measure, and whether they reflect public moral concerns.139 However,
insofar as the AB addresses their moral status, it does so by reference to the first,
domestic, sense of public morals discussed above, understood in a sociological
rather than political sense.140 Given the prominence of domestic public morals
in motivating the measure, this makes some sense. However, the account above
suggests that we also consider whether the exemptions might reflect public
moral concerns in the second, international and political, sense.141 It is here
that the evidence of international consensus on the importance of protecting
indigenous communities is relevant. Recognising the dual aspects of public
morals thus facilitates acknowledging the complexity of morally motivated
measures, while still maintaining appropriate scrutiny of these.
On the second question, the AB focused on the ways these exceptions un-
dermined the instrumental goals of the measure in alleviating animal suffering.
This reflects the same tendency, noted above, to approach protecting public
morals through the proxy of protecting the non-moral interests those morals
pick out. If we read ‘protecting public morals’ as ‘preventing seal suffering’,
then the IC and MRM exceptions, which contain no animal welfare provi-
sions, are clearly not reconcilable with that goal. If, however, we recognise that
our first concern is the moral standard, rather than the goal, then we might
reach different conclusions. Most obviously, taking a domestic perspective, we
might think that a ban on products of commercial seal hunts, the central case
of the morally objectionable practice, was sufficient to express the community’s
shared view, and thereby reinforce the relevant standard. This might be true
notwithstanding that European citizens did not distinguish amongst seal prod-
ucts based on the type of hunt involved. Indeed, permitting seal products under
the exceptions might actually strengthen the relevant public morals, through
providing opportunities for discursive contestation and reinforcement.142 Link-
ing domestic and international perspectives, we might recognise that elements
of international public morals, including both concerns to protect indigenous
communities from economic harm, and concerns to respect their particular
cultures, could explain why no animal welfare conditions were attached to the
IC exception.143 In each case, focusing on the protection of public morals as
such, rather than on an instrumental proxy, suggests quite different answers
to the questions raised by the chapeau. However, again, we can only sensibly
139 See, for example, EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.139, 5.146.
140 ibid, §5.147, 5.164; (Panel Report) WT/DS400/R, §7.402. While references to the legislative
process might suggest the AB was open to a political understanding, they seem more pertinent
to identifying the measure’s objective.
141 For the AB’s skepticism of arguments that concern for Inuit communities fell under European
public morals, see EC-Seals (Appellate Body Report), §5.148.
142 cf the discussion at n 129 above.
143 Thus Howse and Langille highlight the reference, in the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to protecting communities’ right to live by traditional means: Howse
and Langille, n 123 above, 385, 403.
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tackle those questions once we know what public morals are, and why their
protection matters.
CONCLUSION
This is a paper about Article XX of the GATT. As such, it has hopefully offered
a useful perspective on that provision. While by no means exhaustive, I have
tried to flesh out in some detail the implications of my argument for Article
XX, including on some specific interpretive points; readers should be well
positioned to complete that analysis for other points if desired.
However, at a more general level, this is also a paper about self-determination
in economic regulation, and, more generally still, about the methods and
theoretical approaches that are appropriate to international economic law schol-
arship. I can do no more than gesture at its implications at these levels here.
Any serious elaboration would require something much more substantial than
the present paper.144
As an account of self-determination, the present argument can be adapted
to make sense of much that appears elsewhere in the WTO: the SPS and TBT
agreements; trade remedies rules; the special place of agriculture; and indeed
key aspects of the services rules, including exceptions and rules on market
access and domestic regulation. And beyond the WTO entirely, it can help
us think about economic self-determination in such contexts as debt crises,
investment arbitration, and regional integration.
As an essay in methods, it has hopefully shown that liberal political philoso-
phy can offer useful perspectives on practical, doctrinal problems of WTO law.
In many cases, those perspectives will be more illuminating than more com-
mon economic or sociological approaches. Yet this need not imply they should
displace these latter approaches. Most obviously, international economic law
is about economics, so it would be perverse to suggest interpreting it wholly
without regard to economic ideas. However, if readers, faced with practical and
doctrinal problems, are led to inquire what political philosophy, together with
history, economics and sociology, might have to say, then this paper will have
served its methodological purpose.
144 While by no means complete, some of these implications are worked out in more detail in
Suttle, n 30 above.
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